Euthanasia

Euthanasia can be defined as the bringing about the death of a being for humane reasons, or it is the killing of a person with the intent of ending his or her suffering. There are two main types of euthanasia and these are passive euthanasia, which is legal in the United States, and active euthanasia, which is considered illegal but it is still practiced by some physicians. Active euthanasia is undertaken on an individual when his or her doctors and family members make the decision to actively kill to end the agony suffered by this loved one. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, lets the suffering person die by withholding the necessary medical care and allowing the disease to kill the person instead of a fellow human being. The American Medical Association holds that active euthanasia is impermissible due to its involving the intentional ending of human life by another human being and many contemporary philosophers have argued for and against this view discussing the moral permissibility of such an action and some of the most notable arguments come from James Rachels and Thomas Sullivan.

Rachels states that a strong case can be made against the American Medical Association’s doctrine and his main point is that passive euthanasia is not always preferable to active euthanasia. He states that in some cases, there is simply no moral difference between active and passive euthanasia because they are morally equivalent at that time and that active euthanasia may actually be better than passive euthanasia. He says that once a decision the decision has been made not to prolong the patient’s agony, active euthanasia would be preferable because the latter would lead to an unnecessary period of suffering. His most vivid example is the case of severe Down’s syndrome babies born with intestinal obstructions about whom he states that sometimes in such cases, the babies are allowed to die even though if this matter were considered deeply, we would find compelling moral grounds for preferring active euthanasia to passive euthanasia in the vastly greater degree of suffering involved in letting the baby die.

The doctrine that passive euthanasia is preferable to active euthanasia is challenged by Rachels who declares that it leads to decisions concerning life and death based on irrelevant grounds as to whether a person’s life should continue or not. He argues that ordinarily, an intestinal obstruction can be fixed and is not a life or death matter but in the case of a baby with Down’s syndrome who has an intestinal obstruction, the baby is allowed to die because of the Down’s syndrome and not the intestinal obstruction. The presence of the intestinal obstruction in the baby becomes irrelevant due to its having down’s syndrome and it is this argument which justifies allowing the prolonged suffering of the baby before it dies instead of fixing the intestinal obstruction which would relieve it of the pain. This justifies Rachels’ argument against the American Medical Association’s doctrine that this doctrine rests on a distinction between killing and letting die that itself has no moral importance because they both lead to the same end and the means of getting there is inconsequential.

Sullivan, on the other hand, states that Rachels’ interpretation of the American Medical Association’s doctrine is flawed and argues that Rachels’ interpretation that this doctrine draws a distinction between killing and letting die is misplaced and that in fact, it does not draw a distinction between intentionally killing and not intentionally killing. Despite his disagreement with Rachels on this matter, he agrees with Rachels that killing is not always worse than letting die. He states that it is true that if someone is trying to bring about the death of another, then it makes little difference from the moral point of view if his purpose is achieved by action or by malevolent emission. He further agrees with Rachels that passive euthanasia can prolong pain and suffering by stating that it is cruel to stand by and watch a baby with Down’s syndrome die an agonizing death when a simple operation would remove the intestinal obstruction.

According to Sullivan, Rachels treats killing as an act and letting die as an omission; he then argues that there is no moral difference between the two. Contrary to what Rachels says, the American Medical Association does not distinguish between the act of killing and the omission of letting die. He states that refraining from the use of ordinary means to prolong life is intentional killing and therefore wrong but refraining from the use of extraordinary means may not be intentional killing and as such is permissible, and this, Sullivan argues is the real distinction drawn by the American Medical Association and not the one as interpreted by Rachels. He further argues that a physician’s decision to refuse to give extraordinary treatment to his patient may not be prompted by the purpose of bringing about the patient’s death but by other more noble motives. For example, the physician may realize that any further administration of treatment may present little hope of reversing the patient’s dying process or the use of such extraordinary means may cause excruciating to his patient. He argues that such cases do not involve intentional killing because a physician does not intend for his patient to die although he foresees this as the result.

In conclusion, we find that the views of Rachels and Sullivan are not as different as one would at first be tempted to think. In fact, some of their ideas come so close together, it is hard to distinguish one from another. However, there are some differences in their argument that we have noted above, namely, their different points of view concerning the interpretation of the American Medical Association’s doctrine on euthanasia. We are of the opinion that Rachels’ argument is more convincing because it is true that a very thin line divides active euthanasia from passive euthanasia and in fact, the former would be preferable considering that it immediately ends the suffering undergone by a terminally ill patient. In fact, since his or her physicians have already determined that the illness which they have is terminal, it would be better if the suffering of such people would be ended swiftly because keeping them alive by artificial means or by drugs will not save them from their fate. Both active and passive euthanasia end with the same result (death) and it would be wrong for all parties involved not to allow it to come sooner rather than later. Therefore, we argue that the best thing to do would be to allow either the patients themselves, their families, or their physicians to decide what the best thing to do is under the situations named above and that the government and courts should have nothing to do with it.